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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID W. JENSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16417

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a
corporation, and JOSE F.
GONZALES,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for a personal injury sustained by appellant arising from a motor vehicle collision
involving appellant and defendant Gonzales.

Respondent Mountain

States Telephone and Telegraph Company had a vehicle parked near
the scene of the accident and was named as a co-defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
(hereinafter "Mountain Bell") moved for summary judgment in this
matter alleging its actions, whether or not negligent, were not
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.

The lower court

granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, no cause of
action.

The lower court certified the Order granting summary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
as a final judgment.

Plaintiff and defendant Gonzales have

reached a settlement in this matter and a stipulation and order
of dismissal between them has been filed in the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Mountain Bell requests that this Court affirm
the summary judgment granted in its favor by the trial court ani
award its costs incurred.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for damages as a result of an injury to
appellant.

On September 8, 1977, at approximately 2:00 p.m.

appellant was traveling north on State Road 111 on a motorcycle
going approximately 60 mph (Gonzales Depo., p.16).

At the

intersection of State Road 171, plaintiff collided with defenda1
Jose Gonzales who was executing a left-hand turn from Highway
lll to head east on Highway 171 (Gonzales Depo., p .13).

At this

intersection, State Road 111 consists of five lanes, two lanes
running north and two running south, and a middle lane for left·
hand turns (Gonzales Depo. p.9).
At 8:00 a.m. that morning, Mountain Bell began service worl
on underground lines located at the intersection of State Road
111 and State Road 171.

To facilitate the needed repairs and

for the protection of its employees, Mountain Bell parked its
vehicle in the center of the intersection in line with the left
turn lanes and separated and marked off the vehicle with cones
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from all four directions.

(Sciortino Depo., p.26).

Additionally,

in the north and south directions, at distances of approximately
500 ft. and again behind the truck were "Men Working" signs
indicating the presence of Mountain Bell employees.
Depo., p.12).

(Sciortino

They were placed in conformance with standard

Mountain Bell policies and with the Uniform Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices adopted by the Utah Department of Transportation (§41-6-20, U.C.A., 1953, as amended; Sciortino Depo.,
p.71; and "Work Area Protection" pamphlet attached as Exhibit
"A" to defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment). 1 The Mountain Bell vehicle, referred to as a
"step van", had its 4-way flashers on, its headlights on, and
two strobe lights flashing.

(Sciortino depo., p.55) The weather

1
Appellant spends a considerable amount of time citing to a
traffic manual that supposedly governs respondent's repair
operations (Appellant's Brief at 6}. However, as is clear by
reading both appellant's statements and his attached rule, they
are inapplicable for two reasons: (1) those rules were superceded by the Uniform Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices
required by §41-6-20, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, which do not
require Mt. Bell to provide flagmen and obtain department
approval; and (2) Even if those provisions were in effect, they
apply only where traffic in both directions is required to use a
single lane of traffic. That is, flow of traffic in one direction at a time. Here, Mt. Bell's vehicle was placed in the
center of the intersection containing five lanes of traffic. It
was not obstructing thru traffic, but rather those vehicles
making left-hand turns. Since traffic was not obstructed in the
two directions and the motorists were not required to travel in
single lanes, neither traffic flagmen nor traffic signals are
required. Furthermore, appellant makes a bold statement to the
effect that Mt. Bell obtained no approval from the Utah Department of Transportation for its work in the intersection. This
statement has no support in the record and should be totally ._
disregarded.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

on that particular day was clear with high visibility and was a
typical, early September day.

(Gonzales Depo. p. 6).

The loca-

tion of the vehicle's warning cones and signs are set forth in
Exhibit "B" attached to defendant's Memorandum in Support of ite
Motion for summary Judgment.
Appellant complains that the defendant Jose Gonzales was
negligent in that Jose Gonzales was (a) traveling at an excessii
speed, (b) failed to maintain proper lookout, (c) failed to
maintain proper control of his vehicle, (d) failed to yield tie
right of way to the plaintiff, and ( e) made an improper left tu1
(Plaintiff's Complaint,

~V).

Appellant additionally alleges that Respondent Mountain Be:
was negligent in that (a) it parked its vehicle within an inter·
section, (b) was illegally parked, ( c) parked a vehicle in
manner so as

~o

obstruct the view of on-coming traffic, and

failed to adequately warn (Plaintiff's Complaint

such
(d)

~V).

It is not disputed that the Mountain Bell vehicle was
stationary and that the appellant did not strike it.

It is

further undisputed that defendant Jose Gonzales, after realizin\
that his vision was obstructed, turned left in front of the
appellant (Gonzales depo., p.10, 18 and 21) and then collided
with the appellant.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that the

collision between appellant and Gonzales was the actual cause ol
Jensen's injury.

Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff has

recollection of the accident.

(Jensen Depo. p. 6-19).
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I

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONDUCT OF MOUNTAIN BELL WAS NOT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES SUSTAINED
BY APPELLANT.
To place this case in proper perspective, and to render
irrelevant the significant portion of appellant's brief
devoted to the issue of Mountain Bell's negligence, we will
concede, arguendo, for purposes of this appeal only, that the
alleged negligence of Mountain Bell was not determinable by
way of summary judgment.

The same concession was made at the

trial level for purposes of focusing on the key issue--proximate
causation.
Thus narrowed, the case once again presents to this court
the interesting, and oft-misunderstood policy question of the
extent to which the negligence of a passive actor will result in
the imposition of legal responsibility in the case of subsequent acts of negligence by the plaintiff or third parties.
A.

The Issue is One of Law Not One for
Jury Determination

Appellant's argument that these issues should be presented
to a jury for determination perpetuates a common misunderstanding of what has come to be called the
causation."

l~w

of "proximate

Although scholars and courts differ as to how

these concepts should be articulated, most authorities now
seem

So

agree that in its classical application "proximate
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causation" is not a factual determination but is a determination consisting of legal policy which determines, given a set
of facts, the extent to which an actor's negligence exposes him
to liability.

A jury instruction committee comprised of judges

and lawyers of the State of Utah articulated its agreement with
this proposition in its report as follows:
Note that the term "proximate cause" is not
used or defined in the instruction. "Proximate cause," as distinguished from simple
cause and effect, classically involves the
question as to whether the plaintiff is in a
class of persons protected from the risk of
harm which occurred to him, or whether the
harm occurred to him is a harm which he is
protected against. The committee believes
that in the vast majority of negligence cases,
there will be no genuine issue as to "proximate cause," but only as to simple cause and
effect. The committee is further of the
opinion that "eroximate cause" issues when
they occur ordinarilr are and should be
ruled ueon by the trial court as matters of law. 2
[Emphasis added].
A member of that committee, Professor E. Wayne Thode, has
3
written an excellent and extensive analysis of this question.
Professor Thode, in advocating a "duty-risk" approach to the
question as opposed to the "proximate causation" approach
states:
Under the duty-risk method of analysis the
determination of the scope of the legal
system's protection is entirely a court
2
This jury instruction report, approved by this court on July
28, 1976 has subsequently received the partial imprimatur of"
this court in Batty v. Mitchell, 575 p. 2d 1040 1044 (Utah 19!8
I

3

Thode, "Tort Analysis: Duty Risk vs. Proximate Cause and the
Rational Allocation of Functions between Judge and Jury," 197 7
Utah L . Rev. 1.
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function--the jury plays no part-in this aspect of the case. The issue for the court
is whether the risk to which the plaintiff
has been subjected is within the scope of the
defendant's duty. If the answer is in the
affirmative, the court is then obligated as
part of its duty function to set the standard
with which the defendant must have complied to
avoid liability. The jury has the burden of
determining if the standard was breached. 4
This court, although typically reluctant to grant summary
relief in negligence cases or reverse jury determinations,
has adopted the judge/jury allocation of function in this area
by ruling as a matter of law on "proximate cause" issues
frequently.

In Toma v. Utah Power & Light Company, 12 Utah 2d

275, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), the court affirmed a ruling by the
district court judge on a motion for directed verdict.

This

court there discussed the very issue which we now raise--that
of judge/jury allocation:
Strenuous efforts have been repeatedly made
to have us reverse or at least modify the
Hillyard case, particularly as it has to do
with the determination of when proximate cause
becomes a jury question. It has been vigorously argued that this case imposes a severe
and unreasonable burden upon the plaintiff,
and works a grave injustice upon an innocent
injured person. The injured person is often
stopped from holding responsible one joint
tort feasor while prevailing against the other.
Regardless of these many efforts we have consistently upheld our decision in the Hillyard
case. (12 Utah 2d at 287).
In Anderson vs. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Company, 24 Utah 2d
128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970), this court affirmed a ruling as a
4 Id. at 26.
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matter of law by the trial court on proximate causation
on a motion for directed verdict.

See also Velasquez

v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989
(1961) wherein an n.o.v. on a proximate cause issue was
affirmed by the court.
We conclude that a determination, as a matter of
law, of the extent to which Mountain Bell's conduct in
the instant case imposes legal responsibility is entirely
appropriate under the circumstances.
B.

Mountain Bell, Under Utah Law, is Not
Legally Responsible For the InJuries
Incurred by Plaintiff.

To set the stage for an analysis of the legal responsibility of Mountain Bell under the circumstances of the
instant case, it must be recognized that there were three
basic actors involved--Mountain Bell, Jensen, and Gonzales.
As to Mountain Bell, its conduct, at worst, was that of
a stage hand in arranging the props around which the subsequent
collision would occur.

Simply stated, at 8: 00 a. m. on Septem-

ber 8, 1977 (some six hours before the accident) Mountain Bell
parked its repair truck at the intersection in question,
placed warning cones in all four directions, and in the
north/south directions placed "Men Working" signs behind and
ahead of the truck.

The truck had its four-way flashers on,

its headlights on and two strobe lights flashing.

At the time

of the accident, several hours later, the sole Mountain Bell
employee in the area was in a manhole in the intersection and,
therefore, did not witness the accident.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The next actor, in chronological sequence, was Gonzales.
He approached the intersection from the north with the intention of turning left to the east.

Whatever else may be clear

or unclear about Gonzales' testimony, it is certain that he
saw the Mountain Bell truck, that he recognized it obstructed
his vision of oncoming traffic from the south, and that he
sat and pondered the situation for two minutes prior to the
time that he commenced his left turn into the intersection.
The turn was almost immediately followed by the collision
with plaintiff on this motorcycle--Gonzales having estimated
plaintiff's speed at approximately 60 miles per hour. 5
Counsel for the plaintiff, in examining Gonzales by
leading questions, made it perfectly clear that Gonzales saw
and appreciated the dangerous character of the situation:
QUESTION: [by Mr. Dibblee] It was kind of
dangerous, the fact that you couldn't
see everything; isn't that right?
t

ANSWER:

Yes.
[Gonzales deposition at p.33]

5 see for example the Gonzales testimony at page 10 of his
deposition wherein when asked what he did after he arrived
at the intersection and stopped, he said "I wait there. I
couldn't see, you know, in front of me. There was a utility
truck working there. I couldn't see nothing." With respect
to the time that Gonzales had to absorb and digest the
situation, he testified that he waited in the left turn lane
for "about a couple of minutes." (Gonzales depo. at p.18].
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The final actor, the plaintiff Jensen, suffers from
complete amnesia of the accident and immediately preceding
events.

In the absence of any testimony from Jensen, or any

other evidence suggesting that he did not see and appreciate
the conditions of the intersection as he approached it, Jensen
is subject to the applicable legal presumptions under the
circumstances--specifically, he is charged with the knowledge
of those things which he either saw or which, in the exercise
of reasonable care, he could not help but have seen.
~'

See,

Nymen v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961).
Against this straightforward and relatively simple factual

background, we now consider the applicable law as previously
articulated by this court.

The seminal decision was Hillyard

v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953).
It will be recalled that in Hillyard the static negligence

was

that of parking a truck so that its rear end obstructed the
traveled portion of the highway.

Subsequently, driver Vaughn

Aston and passenger Robert Reif, plaintiffs deceased, collided
with the rear end of the truck with Aston claiming he had not
seen the truck, because of other traffic, until immediately
before the collision.

In a lengthy discussion as to whether

the negligence of Aston was an intervening cause, hence exculpa-1
ting the staticly negligent defendant, this court drew the
following critical distinction:
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In applying the test of foreseeability to
situations where a negligently created preexisting condition combines with a later act
of negligence causing an injury, the courts
have drawn a clear-cut distinction between
two classes of cases. The first situation
is where one has negligently created a
dangerous condition [such as parking the
truck] and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he could not fail
to observe, but negligently failed to avoid
it. The second situation involves conduct
of a later intervening actor who negligently
failed to observe the dangerous condition
until it is too late to avoid it. In regard
to the first situation it is held as a
matter of law that the later intervening act
does interrupt the natural sequence of
events and cut off the legal effect of the
negligence of the initial actor. This is
based upon the reasoning that it is not
reasonably to be foreseen nor expected that
one who actually becomes cognizant of a
dangerous condition in ample time to avert
injury will fail to do so. On the other
hand, with respect to the second situation,
where the second actor fails to see the
danger in time to avoid it, it is held that
a jury question exists, based on the
rationale that it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein
others may not observe the dangerous condition until too late to escape it. The
distinction is basically one between a
situation in which the second actor has
sufficient time, after being charged with
knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and
one in which the second actor negligently
becomes confronted with an emergency
situation. 1 Utah 2d at 151 (emphasis in
original).
In Hillyard, of course, because of the immediacy of Aston's
discovery of the truck, the matter was considered to be a
proper question for the jury.

However, this court made it

eminently clear that when the subsequent actor (in this case,
either Gonzales, or Jensen or both) actually becomes cognizant
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of the dangerous condition in ample time to avert it, his
conduct becomes "intervening" in the legal sense and
exculpates the static tortfeasor.

It should be noted that

in the instant case Mountain Bell's conduct is legally even
more remote from the accident than in most of these static
condition proximate cause cases.

Its remoteness is accentua-

ted by the fact that we have the intervening conduct of not
one but two subsequent actors--Jensen and Gonzales.

Gonzales

clearly apprehended the dangerous situation, digested it,
and proceeded notwithstanding it--precisely that conduct
described by this court in Hillyard as being sufficient to
"cut off" prior static negligence.

Jensen, likewise, accordir

to the undisputed evidence, must be charged with having
seen the condition and yet proceeded unsafely into the inter·
section.
Hillyard has several progeny which have consistently up·
held the basic Hillyard analysis.

The decision which is

factually most analogous to the instant case is Velasquez
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989
(1961).

In that case, a truck was parked to the side of the

road protruding into the driven portion of the road.

An

oncoming bus (in which plaintiff was a passenger) approached
the truck and the driver conceded that he saw the truck well
in advance of the ultimate collision.

However, he had some

sort of mental blackout for a few moments and thereby was
unable to avoid colliding with the truck when he finally
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became conscious again.

This court sustained that trial

court's finding that the conduct of the bus driver was not
"legally foreseeable" by the static tortfeasor and, therefore,
that the latter's negligence was not the proximate cause of
the injury.

The following statement of conclusion of that

case is indicative of its similarity to the instant matter:
Applying the foregoing test to our situation:
we think it is not reasonably to be foreseen
that an oncoming driver (Greyhound) would see
(or fail to see) this large, well-lighted
truck so parked upon the highway, and with at
least one and one-half usable traffic lanes
to his left nevertheless run into it. The
trial court was correct in concluding and
entered judgment in favor of Interstate Motor
Lines as a matter of law on the ground that
the negligence of Greyhound was the sole proximate cause of the collision. (Utah 12 2d
at 383).
The recent case of Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702
(Utah 1978) which appellant relies upon heavily in his brief,
further supports the emergency/non-emergency distinction
enunciated in Hillyard and Velasquez.

In Watters, this court

rejected the following jury instruction as incorrect when
applied to the fact situation present in that case:
If a driver creates a dangerous condition with
a motor vehicle, but this condition is such
that another driver, exercising reasonable
care, should have observed and avoided a
dangerous condition, then the negligence of
the later driver is an independent intervening
cause and, therefore the first driver cannot
be the proximate cause of the collision.
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But, in rejecting the instruction, this court was quick to
point out that the instruction was not necessarily incorrect
as a general statement of the law if applied in appropriate
circumstances, citing Hillyard.

The clear import of the

citation to Hillyard was that the emergency/non-emergency
distinction was affirmed by this court.

While the above

instruction was not appropriate in an emergency situation
such as existed in Watters, it is still an accurate statement
of the law as to non-emergency situations, such as here
where there is an intervening act of negligence that "cuts
off" the static negligence of Mountain

Bell.

Unlike Watters

Mountain Bell did not slam on its brakes to create an emergency situation for which it can be held liable.

Unlike

Hillyard, defendant Gonzales and the appellant were not
weaving in and out of traffic so that they were suddenly
confronted with the parked Mountain Bell truck after which
they could not avoid it.

Both Jensen and Gonzales knew or

should have known that the truck was there.

There was

nothing obstructing their view, nothing to prevent them from
taking appropriate precautions.

In short, there was no

emergency situation and therefore, Gonzales' independent
intervening act, rather than Mountain Bell's=parking of the
truck, was the sole proximate cause of appellant's injury.
Numerous decisions in other jurisdictions have consistently held in similar situations that the later act of an

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intervening tortfeasor, and not the parking of the vehicle,
is the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
For example, in Shephard v. Azzarelli Construction Co.,
294 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1974), the appellate court upheld a
summary judgment entered against a plaintiff in a fact
situation similar to the case at bar.

The plaintiff was

injured when, while attempting to make a left-hand turn on a
green light on a busy street, her vehicle was struck by a
car proceeding in a direct course from the opposite direction.
In that action, she sued not the driver of the vehicle that
hit her, but rather the construction company, the owner of
the two trucks, one of which was broken down and both of
which were stopped, unmoving, in the left turn lane, opposite
and across the intersection from her.

Plaintiff contended

that these vehicles blocked her vision of the intersection
and specifically the car into which she turned and with
which she collided.

The Florida court, with a comparative

negligence statute similar to Utah's, affirmed the summary
judgment on the ground that:
The arguably negligent act of permitting a
truck to fall into disrepair [and negligently
being in the intersection obstructing her
vision,] had nothing whatever, 'proximate'
or otherwise to do with the occurrence of
the accident, which would have occurred in
precisely the same way had the trucks merely
been stopped waiting to make a left turn
from their proper location in the intersection.
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In Sims v. Apperson Chemicals, Inc., 185 So.2d 179
(Fla. 1966) the plaintiff brought action for injuries sustained by his children in a collision with the defendant's
automobile.

The plaintiff joined the chemical company which

placed the vehicle in the roadway at night in violation of
municipal ordinances as a defendant for creating the condition.

The trial court held that even if defendant's truck

had been parked on the paved road at night by defendant's
employee in violation of the ordinance, the truck was an
immobile instrumentality that presented a patent situation
and was not an operating, efficient or proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.
The Florida appellate court affirmed the decision
citing numerous cases from jurisdictions such as New Jersey,
North Carolina and Louisiana and held:
In the case at bar it was unimportant whether
the defendant's car rested legally or illegally upon the street, since its obstruction
to the vision of the crossing pedestrian, or
to the driver of a moving car upon the roadway, would, under the testimony, be equally
effective. In either event its impotence for
harm or damage, as an innocuous, immobile
instrumentality must be manifest, since in
both situations it simply presented a patent
condition, and not an operating, efficient or
proximate cause, which can be said to contain
by its activity, that potentiality for harm
or damage, which furnishes the test upon
which the rule of liability in this character
of tort-feasance is predicated. at 182.
Walker v. Illinois Commercial Telephone Co., 43 N.E. 2d
412 (Ill. 1942) is the seminal case in the area.

The Walker
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case involved the parking of a telephone company truck with a
pull trailer so as to obstruct the vision of drivers approaching
an intersection.

A collision occurred and Walker sued the

other driver and the phone company and obtained a judgment
against both.

The court in that case held that although the

initial act of negligence may be the occasion for an intervening cause which intervenes and produces the injury, the
intervening cause will be held to be the proximate cause of the
injury unless the intervening act is within the control of the
party responsible for the responsible act.

The court dismissed

the action against the phone company holding:
. . . that the truck being there, at that
particular time, did nothing more than
furnish a condition by which the injury to
the plaintiff was made possible. The proximate cause of the injuries and damages
complained of, was the contributing negligence of plaintiffs and the negligence of the
defendant Norriss. (at 416)
Further, the court found that the intervening act was not within
the control of the phone company.
In Fultz v. Myers, 282 N.E. 2d 488 (Ill. 1971) with a
similar fact situation, the Illinois Appellate Court reiterated
the holding in Walker that an obstruction only furnished a
condition for the later intervening negligence of others and
held that:
As to the cross-appeal of the Plaintiff against
Defendant Folks, [a co-defendant who had placed a
vehicle in the intersection but who did not collide
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with either the plaintiff or defendant] the question
becomes one of whether there was an intervening
cause or in other terms whether the parking of the '
Folks automobile was the proximate cause of the
accident here in question. It is to be noted that
if the act complained of does nothin~ more than
create a condition that makes the in]ury possible
by some subsequent independent act of a third
person, the creation of the condition is not the
proximate cause of the in]ury. at 490 (Emphasis
supplied)
1

Its position upon the street was obvious to all
persons and a condition necessary to be reckoned
with by the traveling public. Under the above
rule, we are not of the opinion that it can be
considered an operating, efficient or proximate
cause of appellant's injuries. (at 491)
As has been consistently held by the above-cited cases ~
supported by the Utah decisions in Hillyard; Velasquez; Toma:j
Anderson, respondent Mountain Bell's negligent act was not the
proximate cause of appellant's injury; that act was cut

off~

later intervening acts of Jensen and Gonzales which became th<
proximate cause of appellant's injury.

I

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing legal authorities and the facts
of this case, it is clear that Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Company was not and is not the proximate cause of

I
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I

...._

appellant's injuries.

This court should affirm the judgment

of the lower court.
DATED this

~day

of

~

, 1979.

~---fRO~T~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed, postage prepaid, to James R. Soper and Richard C. Dibbl,
400 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this~ day of

tl~,

1979.
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